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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  International  Energy  Charter,  signed  by  64 states  in May  2015,  is analysed  here  against  the  structure
of  the existing  formal  institutions  of  international  energy  governance  as  outlined  in the  literature.  In
terms  of  actors,  the  Charter  has a Europe/Eurasia  centred  nucleus  of  signatory  states  accompanied  by  the
United States,  China  and some  further  ‘regional  ambassador  countries’  in  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin  Amer-
ica.  However,  references  to  non-state  actors  are  scant.  In terms  of  the  dimensions  of  energy  policy,  the
Charter  is relatively  comprehensive,  pertaining  to all main  sources  of energy,  addressing  the modernisa-
tion  of infrastructure  and  technology;  stressing  non-discriminatory  ownership  and  taxation  of  resources,
likewise  facilitation  of energy  trade  and  investment;  while  remaining  a non-binding  political  frameworknternational Energy Charter retaining  sovereignty  over  resources;  and  omitting  climate  change  issues  from  its  references  to  market-
based measures  in environmental  protection.  The  Charter  remains  instrumental  to  protect  the  market
interests  of large energy  consumers  and  represents  at best  incremental  progress  vis-à-vis linking  the
interests  of  producers,  transit  states  and  consumer  states.  However,  it offers  few  building  blocks  for  a
more  precise  roadmap  or eventual  Treaty.
© 2015  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
During the past half decade, several observers have lamented
he absence of proper international energy governance [1]. It is
ften claimed that we have a ‘complex and fragmented land-
cape of parallel, overlapping, and nested institutions’ which fails
o respond to current international energy challenges [2]. These
hallenges convey the trilemma of multiple problems of energy
ecurity, access to energy, and the negative environmental and
limatic externalities created by the extraction, production, trans-
ort and consumption of energy [3]. Faced with such challenges,
he existing international institutions are ‘utterly outdated’, espe-
ially when compared to international governance in other areas
1]. Moreover, the existing institutions have a ‘partial scope, lim-
ted membership and/or weak authority’ [4]. Their weakness stems
rom the hybrid nature of international energy governance, where
ultilateral institutions co-exist and compete with strong bilateralnd bloc relations [5].
Given the alleged shortcomings of international energy gover-
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Energy Charter in May  2015 will improve matters [6]. In this
short communication, I will argue that the event reﬂects at best
instrumental or incremental progress in international energy gov-
ernance. While the Charter is likely to attract further debate, I
will highlight three issues: the actors involved; the dimensions
of energy policy covered; its functions regarding current energy
challenges and energy transitions; then conclude by summarising
brieﬂy mentioning some remaining problems in the further insti-
tutionalisation of international energy governance.
2. Material and methods
The material utilised in this short communication is restricted
to the text of the International Energy Charter and the relevant lit-
erature. The method employed is a qualitative content analysis of
the Charter’s content in light of the structure of the existing for-
mal  institutions of international energy governance as outlined in
the literature. More speciﬁcally, I will treat the Charter as repre-
senting the soft law end of formal regulation in this area. In other
words, it is yet another non-binding political declaration with lim-
ited precision, regulatory authority and power to issue obligations.
Nevertheless, given the trend for an enhancing role of states and
politics in international energy issues, even as a soft law regula-
tion, the Charter is important in that it articulates a political will to
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Table  1
Signatory states to the European Energy Charter, Energy Charter Treaty and International Energy Charter.
Signatory state European Energy Charter 1991 Energy Charter Treaty 1994 International Energy Charter 2015
EU Member States (n = 28) X X X
EEA  Member States
Iceland X X
Liechtenstein X X
Norway X X (did not ratify) X




Bosnia and Herzegovina X





Turkey (observer) X X X




Israel (adopted, not signed)
Jordan X X








Belarus X X (did not ratify, applies provisionally) X
Kazakhstan X X X
Kyrgyzstan X X (adopted, not signed)
Russia X X (did not ratify)
Tajikistan X X (adopted, not signed)
Turkmenistan X X X
Uzbekistan X X X
Other  states
Afghanistan X X X





Japan X X X
Mongolia X X X














United  States of America X 
Yemen  X 
educe transaction costs, create the necessary order and mitigate
he negative externalities of the energy sector. These are highly
arranted functions of international institutions [7].
. Results
.1. Actors included
The International Energy Charter was signed at a ministerial
onference at The Hague in the Netherlands, which remains a key
uropean natural gas and oil producer. The preparation of the Char-
er involved the signatory states of the 1991 European Energy
harter, and the resulting 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, both of
hich represented efforts to support energy trade in the aftermath
f the Cold War. Further invitees included the observer States of the
nergy Charter Conference, and a dozen further states including the
merging powers Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa.X
X
X
Such wide-ranging consultation among states was  important
given the relatively diverse group of signatories to the European
Energy Charter diminished to a practically Eurasian core group
of countries when its binding supplement, the Energy Charter
Treaty, was signed in 1994. The subsequent loss of momentum
in the Energy Charter process necessitated new diplomatic efforts
[2]. Several structural changes underpinned this renewed demand
for diplomacy. Many emerging states empowered themselves by
increasing their energy exports, while many others became more
dependent on these new exporters. Anticipated increasing scarcity
altered producer–consumer relations and rendered energy com-
modities strategic. The overall structure of international relations
became more multipolar. Competing institutions also emerged,
including the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue and the Energy Commu-
nity [5,8].
The 64 signatory states of the International Energy Charter as
of August 2015 exceeds the number of original signatories to the
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Table 2
Signatory states to the International Energy Charter not previously part of the Euro-
pean Energy Charter or Energy Charter Treaty.
Bangladesh X
Benin X
Botswana (adopted, not signed)
Burkina Faso (adopted, not signed)




Iran (adopted, not signed)
Nigeria (adopted, not signed)
Philippines (adopted, not signed)
















































in 2009 questioned the whole Energy Charter process.
The International Energy Charter calls to ‘facilitate the opera-uropean Energy Charter (originally 49 states plus the EU; as of
ugust 2015, 66 states) or the Energy Charter Treaty (originally 49
tates plus the EU; today 52). Yet it falls short of the number of
ignatories to the Statute of the International Renewable Energy
gency (IRENA). Seventy-ﬁve states signed the IRENA Statute in
009. Today it has 143 members, with a further 29 states in acces-
ion. By comparison, as of August 2015, 11 states intend soon to sign
he International Energy Charter although that number is likely to
row.
The 28 Member States of the EU are the core signatories of the
ew Charter. Of the European Economic Area, which extends the
U’s common market regulation beyond the Union, also largely
is-à-vis energy markets, Norway and Switzerland signed. Of the
nergy Community, which more speciﬁcally extends the EU’s
nergy acquis further beyond its borders, ﬁve countries have signed
Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova,
erbia, Ukraine), likewise a candidate country to the Energy Com-
unity Treaty (Georgia) and two observers (Armenia, Turkey).
oreover, some signatory states of the Charter are the EU’s part-
ers through its neighbourhood policy, where energy relations are
lso signiﬁcant (Jordan, Morocco and Palestine).
A further group of signatories consists of Eurasian countries in
rea of the former Soviet Union; most of these were already signa-
ories to both the European Energy Charter and the Energy Charter
reaty. Finally, some signatories in Africa, Asia and Latin America
ave a history with the European Energy Charter. Among these, the
eturn of the United States to multilateralism is signiﬁcant. How-
ver, so also is the current refusal of other large fossil fuel producers
nd consumers Australia, Canada and Indonesia to augment their
xisting commitment to the European Energy Charter by signing
ts updated version, the International Energy Charter (see Table 1).
The most prominent completely new entrant to multilateral
nergy governance in a signatory capacity to the International
nergy Charter is China. Among large fossil fuel producers, Iran
nd Nigeria have adopted but not signed the Charter. They are also
he only OPEC members within the Charter’s remit. Among notable
onsumer countries, the Philippines and South Korea have adopted
ut not signed the Charter. Of other relevant blocs, the G20 is not
rominent among the signatories, even though it is in principle
ell placed for international energy governance, representing both
stablished and emerging powers, ﬁve continents, approximately
our-ﬁfths of world total energy consumption and of CO2 emissions
2,8]. Missing from this fairly well representative but diverse bloc
re Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
ussia and Saudi Arabia, all of them large fossil fuel producers.
he signiﬁcant fossil fuel producers of the ASEAN, where member
tates are endeavouring to integrate their energy markets, are also
issing [9] (see Tables 1, 2).l Science 11 (2016) 92–96
At its inception, the International Energy Charter remains a
relatively regional document in terms of signatory states. Its
Europe/Eurasia centred nucleus is accompanied by the United
States, China and some further ‘regional ambassador countries’ in
Africa, Asia and Latin America. At the same time, the Charter refers
little to other groups of actors such as energy companies, interna-
tional ﬁnancial institutions or NGOs, which have assumed more
weight in international energy governance [10,11]. Indeed, the
Charter remains a traditional diplomatic and political framework
outlining several generic objectives and some areas of implementa-
tion without issuing any obligations. Its so far limited geographical
coverage, especially of emerging states producing fossil fuels, is
explicable by referring to the dimensions of energy policy it covers.
3.2. Dimensions of energy policy covered
The Charter is sufﬁciently comprehensive to address the com-
plex nature of international energy governance, where at least four
dimensions are discernible: resource development, infrastructure
and technology; costs, ﬁnance, business models and markets; insti-
tutions; and the ecological and climate dimension [12].
(i) In terms of resource development, the infrastructure
and technology dimension, the Charter covers all main energy
resources—oil, natural gas, nuclear energy, coal and renewables,
while it also touches upon end products by referring to electricity
production. However, there is no mention of the various segments
of renewables or prioritisation of any sources of energy or rank-
ing them in any way. While this wide coverage seeks to attract
as many actors as possible by offering something for everyone, it
represents incremental progress in relation to the existing struc-
ture of institutions of international energy governance. There are
several segment-speciﬁc formal institutions and regulations which
together account for a fragmented structure. The OPEC is concerned
with oil. The main regulations of the IEA concern oil stocks, although
it conducts research on all main energy resources. IRENA works on
renewables while the IAEA addresses nuclear energy, and so on.
The Charter further refers to the ‘modernisation, renewal and
rationalisation’ of the energy infrastructures of signatory countries,
for ‘maximising the efﬁciency of production, conversion, transport,
distribution and use of energy’ [6]. It mentions clean and low-
emission technologies and energy efﬁciency. Crucially, it expresses
the growing concern of actors in the EU, the United States and China
in particular, regarding the diversiﬁcation of energy sources and
supply routes. However, this may  be one of the features persuad-
ing regionally pivotal fossil fuel exporters locked in pipeline-based
exports to refrain from signing the Charter, such as Algeria, Azer-
baijan and Russia even though they seek to diversify their export
infrastructure.
(ii) In terms of the costs, ﬁnance, business models and markets
dimension, the Charter is instrumental to reiterating the economic
preoccupations of the European Energy Charter and the Energy
Charter Treaty. The former remains a political declaration, while the
latter introduces binding regulation on investment, trade and tran-
sit related issues, including a dispute settlement mechanism [13].
On this basis, the new International Energy Charter commits its sig-
natories to ‘avoid imposing discriminatory rules’ on the ownership
of resources, operation of companies and taxation. Such restrictions
prevail for example in the pipeline based gas export monopoly of
Gazprom in Russia, and in Russia’s Arctic offshore where Gazprom
Neft and Rosneft are privileged actors and foreign companies as a
rule banned from new ﬁeld acquisitions. These restrictions are sig-
niﬁcant as Russia’s ﬁnal withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treatytion of market forces and promote competition’ and to remove
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ell as investments, in line with WTO  provisions and nuclear
on-proliferation regimes. It recognises the role of ‘commercially
ound’ conditions for transit; and stresses the development of
ross-border oil and gas networks and power grids to practically
acilitate energy trade [6]. These provisions are instrumental to the
argely market centred interests of the European signatories and
he United States. Yet, they are at odds with the remaining devel-
pmentalist, market socialist and state capitalist energy policies of
everal large fossil fuel producer and consumer countries of Eurasia
nd Asia. However, competition is a growing megatrend [14]. For
xample, South East Asian states strive to introduce more compe-
ition into their energy sectors as the current Charter signatories
hina and Japan have attempted to do [9]. For many signatories in
est Africa and Latin America, the Charter’s provisions on access
o capital, the removal of barriers to and protection of investments,
ogether with the creation of a legal framework for foreign invest-
ents, are crucial in order to improve energy access, develop new
ources of energy and promote economic growth [15]. Unfortu-
ately, expectations for private investment appear overblown for
ackling energy access and poverty [3]. Meeting energy security
eeds and existing policy goals will require USD 1.6 trillion by 2035.
ddressing the energy poverty challenge will cost an additional
SD 1 trillion [11]. In sub-Saharan Africa, 68% of the population
acks access to electricity and in developing Asia, 17% [10].
(iii) In terms of the institutional dimension, the main thrust of
he Charter is to provide a non-binding political framework for the
ew relationships that have recently formed among producer, con-
umer and transit states. It mentions upfront developing countries
nd emerging economies, and the need for a ‘structured dialogue
ith non-signatories of the European Energy Charter’ [6]. The Char-
er makes a welcome move from the overwhelming prioritisation
f the security of supply concerns of European consumer states
owards facilitating access to energy sources, services and tech-
ology. The explicit recognition of ‘the sovereignty of each State
ver its energy resources, and its rights to regulate energy trans-
ission and transportation within its territory’ [6], reiterates an
stablished norm of international energy law [16], and is directed
t resource-rich states like Russia, on whom many other energy
xporters depend for transit. However, to the extent that the Char-
er advances the competition and market interests alongside the
compatibility of national and regional energy systems’ and the cre-
tion of ‘a common energy space’ [6], such sovereignty will always
e conditional. Yet, for a country like Kazakhstan, which chaired
he ﬁnal negotiations for the Charter during 2014, the resulting
ocument helps to create a multilateral institutional basis for its
therwise potentially asymmetrical natural gas and oil trade rela-
ions with China [15]. A multilaterally accepted framework is even
ore crucial for smaller states dependent on co-operation with
nternational ﬁnancial institutions, donor countries and foreign
evelopers.
(iv) Regarding the ecological and climate dimension, the Char-
er quite realistically proceeds from the ‘trilemma between energy
ecurity, economic development and environmental protection’
ithout elevating any of these grand challenges above the others.
rying to reconcile these somewhat incompatible objectives, the
harter advocates no particular energy system and remains open
o actors with highly diverging interests. It does not mention cli-
ate change but more speciﬁcally addresses energy efﬁciency and
nvironmental protection, encouraging ‘the clean and efﬁcient use
f fossil fuel resources’ and ‘use of renewable energy sources and
lean technologies’ equally. It strives to reduce gas ﬂaring, encour-
ging sharing of best practices on clean energy, investment and
low emission technologies’ [6]. Regarding implementation, the
harter foresees joint safety principles and guidelines, exchange
f knowhow, education, training and R&D activities. It is careful
o accompany almost any mention of ‘environmental problems’l Science 11 (2016) 92–96 95
or ‘costs’ with references to ‘market-based’ or ‘market-oriented’
measures and instruments [6].
3.3. Tackling energy challenges and steering energy transitions?
The International Energy Charter sets some general signposts for
the large-scale reform of energy systems foreseen by many other
international institutions such as the IEA, EU or the UN climate
change institutions. Yet by not privileging any energy challenge,
source or technology over others, the Charter offers few building
blocks for a more precise roadmap or eventual Treaty. Any follow-
up work is in fact fairly demanding because the vested interests
among the current signatories vary widely even as regards tran-
sitions to renewable energy in China, Denmark or Japan, each of
which is implementing ambitious projects in this area [17]. Prior to
such intensiﬁcation of cooperation, the likely priority is persuad-
ing more countries to sign the new Charter. This will be difﬁcult
on its own—so different are the interests of, say, in current non-
signatories India, Russia or Qatar.
The Charter may  thus serve, for example, as a political foun-
dation for cross-border oil or natural gas extraction or transport
projects between Kazakhstan and China. Equally well, it can serve
the development of new decarbonising energy systems in Morocco
or the Euro-Mediterranean solar plan project [15]. In fact, such
co-existence of the traditional fossil fuels dominated agenda and
the emerging transitions to new decentralising and decarbonis-
ing agendas prevail in many countries. Moreover, in countries
spearheading the ongoing energy transitions, such as Denmark or
Germany, public funding is crucial to any progress [18]. In Denmark,
part of public funds to support the energy transition through which
consumers become producers, wind power receives feed-in tariffs
and smarter energy networks are developed, come from the taxa-
tion of the fossil fuels industry. In this sense, we once more ﬁnd
the Charter an instrument of careful balancing. This may  prove
a catalyst rather than a predicament in its further adoption and
implementation.
4. Conclusion
I have portrayed the new International Energy Charter as rep-
resenting at best incremental progress in international energy
governance. To a degree, it has revitalised the Energy Charter pro-
cess in terms of attracting some new signatories, although not all
the original signatories of the European Energy Charter of 1991
are yet convinced about signing. To this end, the Charter treats
the interests of energy producers and transit states on more equal
terms vis-à-vis those of energy consumers, just as some other insti-
tutions, like the International Energy Forum, have sought to do.
Nevertheless, the Charter’s references to competition and diversiﬁ-
cation remain instrumental to the market interests of its European
core and may  continue to obstruct several major fossil fuel pro-
ducers with developmentalist or state capitalist policy preferences.
Although the Charter makes little reference to concretely align-
ing those highly diverse interests, its references to low emission
and clean energy technologies can link the established and emerg-
ing economies, and states and companies. The Charter mentions
in passing how ‘commercial forms of cooperation may  need to be
complemented by intergovernmental cooperation’ [6]. This may
ring equally true for many strategists in state-owned companies
in the Persian Gulf as for an increasing number of policy-makers in
European capitals.The notion of incremental progress becomes even more appro-
priate if we examine the Charter against the deep structure of the
informal institutions of international energy governance. Here we
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ormal institutions could be remedied by efforts to promote the
onvergence of the underlying rules and norms shaping the conduct
f actors [19]. On this more social scientiﬁc level of analysis, which
ust remain the subject of future research, we know how informal
nstitutions such as practices, norms and rules may  serve as pow-
rful barriers to the realisation of objectives expressed not only in
olitical declarations as the Charter, but also in binding treaties. In
his sense, the Charter will be tested not only in legal analysis vis-
-vis other formal regulations, but also in daily interactions among
he engineers and economists of energy companies, and regulators
nd ﬁnanciers whose political masters have adopted the Charter.
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